The short answer
Use a public CA for anything that people or systems outside your control connect to, such as public websites, APIs used by customers and mail servers that talk to the internet. Use an internal CA for names and systems that only your own devices use, such as internal services, service-to-service traffic and managed devices. Most organisations need both.
What a public CA gives you, and what it asks
A public CA’s root certificates come preinstalled in browsers and operating systems, so its certificates work on every client without setup. In return, it must follow the CA/Browser Forum’s TLS Baseline Requirements:
- Short lifetimes. At most 200 days now, 100 from March 2027 and 47 from March 2029. We explain the schedule in certificate lifetimes are falling to 200, 100 and 47 days.
- Validated names only. The CA must check that you control each name, and it may not issue for internal names (names that do not end in a public top-level domain, such as
server.local) or reserved IP addresses (Baseline Requirements section 4.2.2). - Public records. Public certificates are recorded in Certificate Transparency logs that anyone can search. Every name you put on a public certificate becomes public, including names like
vpn-finance.example.com.
What an internal CA gives you, and what it asks
An internal (private) CA is one you run or rent, whose root certificate you distribute to your own devices. Because it is not publicly trusted, the Baseline Requirements do not bind it. Apple, for example, says its 398-day limit on TLS certificates does not affect certificates from user-added or administrator-added roots.
That freedom comes with work:
- Trust distribution. Every client must trust your root: operating system stores, Java trust stores, container images, mobile devices and partner systems. Anything you miss fails to connect.
- Key protection. Whoever holds the CA’s private key can create a certificate for any name your devices trust. Keep the root offline, issue from an intermediate and limit who can use it.
- Revocation. Publish revocation information that your clients can reach, and know how you would replace an intermediate if its key were exposed.
- Your own policy. You choose lifetimes, key types and names. Choose short lifetimes anyway: they limit the damage of a leaked key, and if renewal is automated they cost nothing.
Common options include Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services, HashiCorp Vault and OpenBao PKI, cloud services such as AWS Private CA, and private CAs that speak ACME, which lets you use the same automation as for public certificates. Our guide to automating renewal with ACME applies to those too.
Choosing for each certificate
| Certificate | Public CA | Internal CA |
|---|---|---|
| Public website or customer API | Yes | No: clients will not trust it |
| Internal web app used only on managed devices | Works, but publishes the name | Usually the better fit |
| Service-to-service inside your network | Possible but limited to public names | Yes |
Names without a public domain, such as .local or .corp | Not allowed | Yes |
| Devices, appliances and Wi-Fi or VPN client certificates | Usually not suitable | Yes |
| Partner systems you do not manage | Yes | Only if the partner installs your root |
Firewalls that inspect TLS use an internal CA of their own, which needs the same care. We cover that in managing certificates on load balancers and firewalls.
Keep both in one inventory
Whatever mix you choose, track public and internal certificates in one place, with owners and expiry for each. Internal certificates expire too, and because they are not in public logs, they are harder to find, a problem we look at in how to discover every certificate on your network.
Where clm.mt fits
We build clm.mt, so this is about our own product. It manages public and internal certificates side by side. Public CAs through ACME and private ACME CAs are supported, and so is Microsoft AD CS through a domain-joined Windows agent. HashiCorp Vault and OpenBao PKI and AWS Private CA are in preview: Vault and OpenBao PKI have been tested against a real OpenBao server, AWS Private CA only against a local test double, and neither against a customer’s own setup yet.
The integrations page has the full list with limits, the docs explain setup and pricing lists the plans.
Sources
- CA/Browser Forum, TLS Baseline Requirements, sections 4.2.2 and 6.3.2.
- Apple, About upcoming limits on trusted certificates.
- IETF, RFC 6962: Certificate Transparency.