What was decided
In April 2025 the CA/Browser Forum, the body where certificate authorities and browser makers agree the rules for publicly trusted TLS certificates, approved ballot SC-081v3. Every certificate issuer that voted said yes or abstained, and all four certificate consumers (Apple, Google, Microsoft and Mozilla) voted yes.
The ballot cuts the maximum lifetime of a public TLS certificate from 398 days to 47 days in three steps. It also cuts how long a certificate authority (CA) may reuse an earlier check that you control a domain. The rules now sit in the TLS Baseline Requirements, in section 6.3.2 for lifetimes and section 4.2.1 for validation reuse.
The first step is already in force. Since 15 March 2026 no public CA may issue a TLS certificate that lasts longer than 200 days.
The schedule
The limit depends on the date the certificate is issued, not the date it is installed.
| Issued on or after | Maximum lifetime | Domain validation reuse |
|---|---|---|
| Before 15 March 2026 | 398 days | 398 days |
| 15 March 2026 | 200 days | 200 days |
| 15 March 2027 | 100 days | 100 days |
| 15 March 2029 | 47 days | 10 days |
The Baseline Requirements also say a CA should stay a day under each limit (199, 99 and 46 days) and should not issue for the full maximum by default. Expect certificates a little shorter than the headline numbers.
Organisation details for OV and EV certificates, such as your company name and address, change once. Since 15 March 2026 a CA may reuse that checked information for 398 days, down from 825.
Why it matters even if nothing has broken yet
Many teams have not felt the first step. A 398-day certificate issued on 14 March 2026 is still valid until April 2027, so the first renewals under the new rules are only now arriving across most estates.
The real change comes with the later steps:
- Renewals multiply. A 398-day certificate was renewed about once a year. If you renew two thirds of the way through a certificate’s life, a 100-day certificate needs five or six renewals a year, and a 47-day certificate about twelve. An estate of 300 certificates goes from about 300 renewals a year to about 3,600, or ten every day.
- Domain checks happen almost every time. From March 2029 a CA may reuse a domain validation for only 10 days. With a 47-day certificate, that means a fresh check of domain control for nearly every renewal. If that check needs a person to add a DNS record or answer an email, the person becomes the bottleneck.
- The calendar reminder stops working. A yearly reminder and a spreadsheet can just about keep up with yearly renewals. At twelve renewals a year per certificate, anything manual will eventually miss one, and a missed renewal is an outage.
The rules apply to publicly trusted TLS server certificates: the ones browsers and operating systems trust by default. Certificates from your own internal CA are not bound by the Baseline Requirements. They still expire, and the same automation helps them, but their lifetimes are your decision.
What to do now
- Find every certificate you depend on. Start with your public names in Certificate Transparency logs, where public CAs record what they issue. Then look inside your network: load balancers, firewalls, appliances, mail servers and anything a vendor installed. You cannot renew what you have not found.
- Mark the ones that are renewed by hand. Note for each certificate who renews it, how it is installed and how the service reloads it. The hand-installed ones on appliances and cloud consoles are where 47 days will hurt first.
- Move renewal to ACME. ACME (RFC 8555) is the standard protocol for requesting and renewing certificates automatically. Most public CAs support it. Where your CA offers it, also use ACME Renewal Information (RFC 9773), which lets the CA tell your client when to renew, including early when a certificate must be replaced.
- Automate domain validation. For names that cannot answer an HTTP challenge, use DNS-01 with a DNS provider API, or delegate the challenge record with a CNAME to a zone your automation controls. Give that automation only the DNS rights it needs.
- Automate the install, not only the request. A renewal is not finished until the new certificate is on the server and the service has reloaded it. Script the install and reload for each kind of system, or use tools that do it.
- Check what is actually served. After each renewal, connect to the endpoint and confirm it presents the new certificate. Alert when a served certificate passes two thirds of its lifetime, so a failed renewal is noticed while there is still time to fix it.
- Remove pins on leaf certificates. Applications or partners that pin a specific certificate break on every renewal. Pin to a CA or a public key you keep, or remove the pin.
- Plan for 100 days, not 47. March 2027 is about four months away. If your process works at 100 days with no manual step, the 2029 change is a setting, not a project.
Where clm.mt fits
We build clm.mt, a certificate lifecycle service, so read this section with that in mind. Agents you install on Linux or Windows renew certificates through ACME (including DNS-01 and ACME Renewal Information) and other CAs, deploy them to the servers and services that use them, and check what is served afterwards. Network and Certificate Transparency discovery is in preview.
Not every target is equally proven. The integrations page says which are supported after tests on real software and services, and which are still in preview. The docs show how setup works, and pricing lists what it costs. If you already have working automation, keep it: the steps above matter more than the tool.
Sources
- CA/Browser Forum, Ballot SC-081v3: Introduce Schedule of Reducing Validity and Data Reuse Periods, voting ended 11 April 2025.
- CA/Browser Forum, TLS Baseline Requirements, sections 4.2.1 and 6.3.2.
- IETF, RFC 8555: Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME).
- IETF, RFC 9773: ACME Renewal Information (ARI) Extension.
- IETF, RFC 6962: Certificate Transparency.